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Researchonhumananterior cingulate cortexhas long indicateda role indetectingconflict.However, efforts to
find parallel effects in non-human primates were surprisingly unsuccessful. Here, Ebitz and Platt (2015) break
the resulting impasse by uncovering what appear to be conflict-related signals in monkey cingulate cortex.In order to get anything done, especially in
the present technological age, it is neces-
sary to resist distraction. If you want to
buy a book online, you must struggle
against having your attention hijacked by
those disturbingly relevant sidebar ads.
If you sit down with the resolve to finally
write that paper, you may end up
spending a significant portion of your
time restraining the impulse to just quickly
peek at your email or social media feed.
Given the ubiquity of such distraction
and its impact on our ability to sustain
goal-directed behavior, it has been a ma-
jor aim of cognitive neuroscience to un-
derstand how the brain regulates conflicts
between goals and distractors.
Human neuroimaging research has
consistently implicated the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) in situations that
involve conflict between a goal-directed
response and a distracting alternative.
For instance, if one is shown the stimulus
GREEN in a red font and is asked to
name the display color, this triggers
greater dACC activity than when the word
presented does not itself name a color
(e.g., GRAIN) (Cole et al., 2009; Shackman
et al., 2011). Moreover, such activity hasbeen shown to predict subsequent in-
creases in cognitive control, manifesting
as an intensified focus on the task (in the
foregoing example, an increased attention
to stimulus color over word identity). Such
findings led to the theory that the dACC
may monitor for conflict, alongside other
signals, in order to guide adaptive adjust-
ments in control (Botvinick et al., 2001).
Over the years, a number of challenges
have been raised to the notion of conflict
monitoring in dACC. A majority of these
have eventually been disconfirmed or
else accommodated within a broader
framework that still involves conflict
(Botvinick, 2007; Shenhav et al., 2013).
However, one formidable difficulty was
raised by single-unit recording studies in
monkeys, which at least initially failed to
detect conflict-related signals in dACC
(see Cole et al., 2009). At first, it seemed
possible that the conflict responses
observed in humans using fMRI and
EEG might not reflect actual single-
neuron spiking activity, but instead
something more epiphenomenal. But no:
Sheth and colleagues (2012) found
conflict-related activity in the same region
of human dACC using both fMRI andsingle-unit recordings and further showed
that lesioning this region impaired con-
flict-related control adjustments. In view
of such results, it seemed that human
and monkey research might simply
be incommensurable, perhaps reflecting
fundamental differences in cingulate
function between species.
However, recent findings have signifi-
cantly altered the lay of the land. First,
a study by Amemori and Graybiel (2012)
offered hints of preserved conflict sig-
naling in monkeys, showing that conflict
betweensimilarly valuedchoices (decision
conflict) was encoded in a medial frontal
region anterior to dACC. And now, as
reported in the present issue, a study by
Ebitz and Platt (2015) provides evidence
for conflict signaling within monkey
dACC itself, in a situation involving inter-
ference between goals and distractors.
Apparent Conflict Signals in
Monkey dACC
In the experiment by Ebitz and Platt, mon-
keys performed a task that required them
to saccade to a visual target on the left or
right side of a computer display. On most
trials, this target was accompanied by a, February 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 455
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Previewssecond stimulus that was task irrelevant
but salient, namely an intact or scrambled
picture of a monkey face. Critically, this
distractor could appear in any of three
locations: immediately adjacent to the
target (congruent distractor); on the
opposite side of the display, adjacent to
the alternative target location (incon-
gruent); or at an upper central location
where no targets ever appeared (neutral).
These different kinds of distractors
allowed the authors to explore two kinds
of conflict that have been previously
studied in the human neuroimaging
literature. ‘‘Action conflict’’ differentiates
incongruent from congruent distractors.
Distractors on incongruent trials cued re-
sponses inconsistent with the goal-rele-
vant response, creating conflict between
competing saccade plans, reflected in a
slower response time. Congruent distrac-
tors, by contrast, cued saccades toward
the target, speeding goal-relevant re-
sponses. As opposed to action conflict,
‘‘task conflict’’ separates both incon-
gruent and congruent distractor trials
from trials in which the distractor was
neutral or absent, reflecting the fact that
in these former cases participants experi-
ence interference between their goal of
detecting the target and the exogenously
triggered ‘‘task’’ of fixating the distractor
item. This triggering effect, and thus task
conflict, is presumed to be stronger on
congruent and incongruent trials than on
neutral trials, because in the former cases
the distractor appears near locations that
are task relevant and thus more avidly
attended.
Ebitz and Platt recorded from dACC
while subjects performed their task and
found that a majority of neurons encoded
the presence of distractors. Many of
these neurons also responded to identical
distractors that were shown during the
inter-trial interval, when no target was
present, but fired more to the distractors
that appeared during the task. Critically,
distractor-responsive neurons fired more
overall when the distractor was congruent
or incongruent rather than when it ap-
peared in a neutral location, consistent
with the signaling of task conflict.
A Link to Variations in Pupil Size
and Task Preparation
By tracking the size of the monkeys’
pupils throughout the task, the authors456 Neuron 85, February 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsewere able to show that conflict-related re-
sponses in dACC were related to trial-to-
trial adjustments in cognitive control.
They found that the size of a monkey’s
pupils at the start of each trial predicted
how distractible the monkey would be
on that trial. Smaller baseline pupil size
predicted reduced influence of distractors
on the monkey’s behavior, i.e., less
response slowing on incongruent trials
and less speeding on congruent trials.
Baseline pupil size also appeared to vary
from trial to trial according to the recent
history of task conflict. Specifically, pupils
were smaller following a trial that involved
either a congruent or an incongruent dis-
tractor. In other words, increased task
conflict on one trial predicted smaller
baseline pupil size on the following trial,
which in turn was associated with
decreased distractibility.
These findings were paralleled by pat-
terns of activity in dACC. The authors
found distractor-sensitive dACC neurons
whose activity also predicted the magni-
tude of adjustments in baseline pupil
size on the following trial, and they
showed that activity in these cells medi-
ated the influence of distractors on sub-
sequent pupil constriction. Overlapping
populations of neurons in dACC revealed
analogous effects when the monkeys
committed an error, both in terms of




Given the long-standing disconnect be-
tween monkey and human studies on
dACC, the findings from Ebitz and Platt
align surprisingly well with current the-
ories of human dACC function. Although
details vary, most contemporary theories
portray the dACC as monitoring task
exigencies in order to guide adaptive
changes in cognitive processing and/or
behavior (Cavanagh and Frank, 2014;
Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Rushworth
et al., 2012; Shackman et al., 2011; Shen-
hav et al., 2013). For instance, we have
recently proposed that dACC regulates
cognitive control function based on a
cost-benefit analysis, which takes into ac-
count both the current demand for con-
trol—signaled by conflict, errors, surprise,
and other quantities—and any reward or
penalties riding on task performancevier Inc.(Shenhav et al., 2013). Under this theory,
one key output channel for the dACC is
via the locus coeruleus, a neuromodula-
tory structure that influences both task
focus and pupil size (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). Clearly, the results from
Ebitz and Platt fit very tidily with such an
account.
Ironically, the challenge is not so much
to square the findings from Ebitz and Platt
with human research, but to understand
how they can be reconciled with previous
studies in monkeys. As noted earlier,
such studies have notoriously failed to
detect conflict-related signals in dACC
(Cole et al., 2009). What might explain
the dramatically different outcome of the
Ebitz and Platt study? The authors them-
selves offer two possible explanations.
First, they suggest that previous studies
may have failed to identify conflict signals
because they focused exclusively on
action conflict rather than testing for
effects of task conflict. This proposal
receives some indirect support from the
human fMRI literature, where task-level
conflict effects (i.e., congruent greater
than neutral) have been described since
some of the earliest studies (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1995). Further-
more, at least two studies have observed
effects of task conflict and action conflict
in different (indeed, non-overlapping)
sectors of the dACC (Desmet et al.,
2011; Milham and Banich, 2005). If such
an anatomical dissociation also exists in
monkeys, it might further explain why
Ebitz and Platt succeededwhere previous
studies have failed.
Nevertheless, some details of the Ebitz
and Platt study create slight complica-
tions for a strong interpretation based on
the notion that monkey dACC is exclu-
sively sensitive to task conflict. First,
certain findings suggest that congruent
trials in their task may have induced not
only greater task conflict than neutral
trials, but also greater action conflict.
The authors report that distractors on
congruent trials often triggered errant
saccades, which presumably often tar-
geted the distractor. And correct re-
sponses on congruent trials were often
displaced toward the distractor. These
observations suggest that congruent tri-
als might have triggered action conflict,
by setting up a competition between re-
sponses aimed at target and distractor.
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PreviewsIf this is the case, then the contrast be-
tween congruent (and incongruent) trials
and neutral trials would not uniquely
isolate task conflict, but would capture
action conflict as well. A further compli-
cation arises from the fact that Ebitz
and Platt did in fact observe neurons
whose activity correlated with action
conflict, as this was operationalized
in their study. Some of these neurons
were more active on incongruent than
congruent trials, while others showed
the reverse pattern, but at an informa-
tional level, of course, these patterns are
equivalent.
The second potential explanation that
Ebitz and Platt offer for the negative
results of earlier monkey studies is that
the behavioral tasks in those studies
may not have induced sufficient conflict
to trigger the kind of pupil-linked shifts
in arousal and task focus that were
observed in the new study. If dACC
activity is inextricably linked with such
psychophysiological shifts, the earlier
failure to detect the sought-for signals
would then be no surprise. While this pro-
posal is technically defensible—earlier
work did not examine changes in pupil
size—it should be noted that some
previous monkey studies did assert evi-
dence for conflict-induced shifts in
cognitive control (e.g., Emeric et al.,
2008; Mansouri et al., 2007). Explaining
the absence of conflict signals in those
studies would thus require a fairly
nuanced and restrictive characterization
of the missing ingredient.
Whatever the appropriate interpretation
for the disconnect from earlier studies, the
findings from Ebitz and Platt do clearly
indicate that monkey dACC neurons
respond to task-relevant distractors andthat these distractor-related signals (in
conjunction with error-related signals)
influence subsequent control states. It
may still be possible that dACC re-
sponded to these control-relevant dis-
tractors for some reason other than that
they generated conflict, for instance, that
they induced a representation of a spe-
cific reward or punishment value. Indeed,
such alternatives continue to be explored
for putative conflict-related findings in hu-
man neuroimaging studies, and it will be
the task of future research to generate
and test these alternative accounts in
monkey dACC, as has been done over
the past two decades of human research.
The dACC’s role in mediating pupillary
adjustments will also need to be further
substantiated through the use of causal
methods (e.g., lesion or inactivation).
Direct investigation of the proposed
role of locus coeruleus in the circuit
governing pupil-linked shifts in control
would also help flesh out the story. Finally,
given that the authors interpret these pu-
pillary effects in terms of shifts in arousal,
future studies would further benefit from
combining these pupillary measures with
complementary measures of such auto-
nomic changes.
Despite the questions they raise, the
findings from Ebitz and Platt already do
something very important, which is to
place the human and monkey literature
on more similar footing, both in terms of
empirical observations and the theoretical
paradigms that naturally apply. We do not
expect all of the residual empirical and
theoretical conflicts to be resolved in
the near future, but are hopeful that the
current study sets these two bodies of
research on course to at least see eye-
to-eye on the final outcome.Neuron 85REFERENCES
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